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Abstract
The massive parallelism and resource sharing embodying to-
day’s cloud business model not only exacerbate the security
challenge of timing channels, but also undermine the via-
bility of defenses based on resource partitioning. We pro-
pose hypervisor-enforced timing mitigation to control tim-
ing channels in cloud environments. This approach closes
“reference clocks” internal to the cloud by imposing a de-
terministic view of time on guest code, and uses timing
mitigators to pace I/O and rate-limit potential information
leakage to external observers. Our prototype hypervisor is
the first system to mitigate timing-channel leakage across
full-scale existing operating systems such as Linux and ap-
plications in arbitrary languages. Mitigation incurs a vary-
ing performance cost, depending on workload and tunable
leakage-limiting parameters, but this cost may be justified
for security-critical cloud applications and data.
1. Introduction
The cloud computing model, which shares computing re-
source among many customers, has become popular due
to perceived advantages such as elasticity, scalability, and
lower total cost of ownership. Clouds typically use virtual-
ization to protect one customer’s computation and data from
another. Virtualization alone does not protect against timing
attacks [40, 57], however, in which a malicious party learns
sensitive information by analyzing the observable timing ef-
fects of a victim’s computation.
Computers contain many shared resources that can be
used for internal timing attacks by a co-resident attacker.
L1 data caches [39], functional units [48], branch target
caches [2], and instruction caches [1] have all been used to
learn sensitive information. Protecting these resources indi-
vidually through partitioning [18, 36, 55] is insufficient as
attackers regularly identify new timing channels, such as L3
caches, memory, and I/O devices. Hardware features such
as address space layout randomization attempt to make at-
tacks more difficult, but often fail to do so adequately [28].
Even external attackers on a remote machine can exploit
side-channels to learn a server’s private key [12], and pos-
sibly any information not processed in constant time [10].
Other existing defenses against timing channels rely on
language support and impose new programming models or
limits to communication with the external world, making
them unusable on unmodified existing application code. De-
terministic containers rely on language support [4, 42, 45,
55], and Determinator requires applications to be ported to
new microkernel APIs [6, 7]. Predictive mitigation offers
important formal techniques to reason about and limit leak-
age [5, 45, 53, 54], but to our knowledge have not been im-
plemented in a fashion compatible with existing languages
and applications.
Today’s cloud consumers expect to execute unmodified
applications in a variety of existing languages, and to have
unrestricted network access, precluding most existing tech-
niques. Practical timing channel protection in cloud envi-
ronments must support unmodified applications, unrestricted
network access, and multi-tenancy.
As a first step towards this goal, we introduce Deterland,
a hypervisor that builds on many of the techniques summa-
rized above, but can run existing guest OS and application
code in an environment guaranteeing strong rate-limits to
timing channel leakage. Deterland uses system-enforced de-
terministic execution to eliminate internal timing channels
exploitable by guest VMs, and applies mitigation to each
VM’s I/O to limit information leakage to external observers.
Deterland permits unmodified VMs and applications to
run in parallel on the same machine and permits remote net-
work interaction, while offering fine-grained control over the
maximum information leakage via timing channels. Deter-
land presents guest VMs with a deterministic internal notion
of time based on instructions executed instead of real time,
and mitigates external leakage via techniques similar to pre-
dictive mitigation but adapted to the hypervisor’s I/O model.
We have implemented Deterland by extending Certi-
KOS [24], a small experimental hypervisor. Unsurprisingly,
we find that Deterland’s general and backward-compatible
timing channel defense comes with performance cost. How-
ever, cloud providers and their customers can tune Deter-
land’s mitigation parameters for different tradeoffs between
performance and leakage risk. Deterland’s overhead can be
fairly small (e.g., less than 10%) in some configurations
on compute-intensive or latency-tolerant workloads, while
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mitigation is more costly for interactive or latency-sensitive
workloads. We expect these costs could be reduced with fur-
ther hypervisor improvements, and could also benefit from
hardware features such as precise instruction counting.
While timing channel mitigation via Deterland is prob-
ably not suitable for all cloud environments, our results
suggest that it may offer promise as a general-purpose,
backward-compatible approach to harden security-critical
cloud computations whose sensitivity justifies the perfor-
mance cost of mitigation.
In summary, this paper’s primary contributions are 1) the
first hypervisor offering general-purpose timing channel mit-
igation for unmodified guest operating systems and applica-
tions, 2) an evaluation of the overheads and leakage tradeoffs
for various workloads, and 3) a tunable mitigation model en-
abling cloud providers and customers to control the tradeoffs
between performance overheads and leakage risk.
2. Background
Timing channels [30, 51] require a victim-owned, attacker-
accessible resource and a reference clock to determine ac-
cess delays in order to infer sensitive information processed
by the victim’s computation. An attacker, co-resident to a
victim’s process, can exploit internal timing channels based
upon shared resources [1–3, 32, 39, 48, 50, 57]. Alterna-
tively, if a victim has a network, or otherwise externally,
accessible resource, an attacker can exploit external timing
channels by observing the timing relationship between in-
puts and outputs of the victim’s resource [10, 12].
2.1 Internal Timing Channels
Figure 1 illustrates a typical internal timing attack, where an
attacker attempts to learn a victim’s secret key as the victim
runs known code such as AES encryption. The attacker be-
gins by selecting a shared resource, such as the L1 cache,
and a time source, such as a high precision timer. In the
case of an L1 cache, the attacker determines which cache
blocks the victim accesses during known code sequences,
e.g., while performing key-dependent table lookups in AES.
To obtain this information, the attacker first touches each of
the L1 cache blocks to evict any data held by the victim,
then yields the CPU to the victim. Upon resuming, the at-
tacker then reads from the cache and measures the time for
the reads to complete. Cache misses will take longer than
cache hits, revealing the victim’s memory accesses. This in-
formation has been used to learn AES keys [3, 50], ElGamal
keys [57], and other sensitive cryptographic content [32].
Internal timing attacks require access to a high-resolution
clock, common in existing computer architectures and made
available to userspace by most operating systems. Even if
the OS or hypervisor were to disable direct high-resolution
timing sources such as this, hardware caches and intercon-
nects [1, 2, 39, 48] as well as I/O devices [30, 51] are read-
ily usable as reference clocks. Even a thread incrementing a
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Figure 1: Internal timing channel. The attacker first flushes
the cache, then the victim’s VM performs memory oper-
ations whose access pattern depends on a secret. The at-
tacker finally uses a high-precision clock to detect the vic-
tim’s cache accesses, thereby deducing the secret.
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Figure 2: External timing channel. The victim’s VM offers
a SSL-secured Web service. The attacker sends a series of
SSL requests and externally measures the victim’s response
delays to deduce the victim’s secret.
shared-memory counter in a tight loop can create a reference
clock [6, 51]. Resource partitioning can eliminate sharing of
cache [55], memory [36], and I/O [18], but partitioning un-
dermines the sharing and oversubscription advantages of the
cloud model [6] and perpetuates an arms race as adversaries
identify more resources usable for timing channel attacks.
Methods for addressing internal timing channel attacks
include language-based techniques and system-enforced de-
terminism. Language-based techniques [4, 42, 45, 54] elim-
inate reference clocks through time-oblivious operations that
effectively execute for a fixed period of time regardless of in-
put. Alternatively, system-enforced determinism [6, 7] elim-
inates reference clocks by isolating processes from sources
of time both internal and external. Clocks accessible to un-
trusted code reveal only the number of instructions executed,
and communication occurs at explicitly-defined points in
time, preventing the modulation of a reference clock. While
useful, these approaches impose new programming environ-
ments, breaking backwards-compatibility with existing code
bases, and do not address external timing attacks.
2.2 External Timing Channels
Figure 2 illustrates a typical external timing attack, where an
attacker attempts to learn a victim’s RSA private key through
network-based communication. The attacker initiates several
SSL sessions with a victim, causing the victim to perform
repeated RSA calculations using the same private key. If the
victim’s RSA arithmetic is not coded with sufficient care,
the time the victim takes for session initiation statistically
reveals information about the victim’s private RSA key. By
measuring response delays against a local reference clock,
the attacker eventually deduces the victim’s private key [12].
This style of attack generalizes to many cryptographic oper-
ations not implemented in constant time [10].
One way to address external timing channels is to delay
all output from the system. Early proposals added random
noise [23, 26], but offered no formal bounds on information
leakage. More recently, predictive mitigation [5, 53] delays
events according to a schedule predicted using only non-
sensitive information. Mispredictions incur a doubling of fu-
ture delays, however, which may result in unbounded perfor-
mance penalties. Additive noise and predictive mitigation do
not directly counter timing attacks in cloud environments, in
which an attacker co-resident with the victim [56] can use
fine-grained timers to exploit shared resources [40].
3. System Overview
Before delving into design details, this section presents a
high-level overview of the Deterland architecture. We use
the word Deterland to refer both to this architecture and
more generically to a cloud environment using Deterland as
its hypervisor. The name Deterland was inspired by Never-
land [9], a mythical place where time stops, and as such must
be inherently free of timing channels.
3.1 Mitigation Domains
A Deterland cloud, shown in Figure 3, may contain multi-
ple mitigation domains. Virtual machines (VMs) in differ-
ent mitigation domains receive different levels of protection
against timing channels, or more precisely, different rate-
limits on information leakage. As we will see in the eval-
uation (§6), mitigation inevitably comes with performance
costs; a choice among several mitigation domains enables
customers to balance performance against leakage risks.
Each mitigation domain has two properties for protecting
against timing attacks: mitigation interval and virtual CPU
speed. VMs within a given mitigation domain delay I/O that
occur within a specified period until the end of that period
constituting a mitigation interval. The virtual CPU speed is
defined as the number of guest instructions executed within
the guest VM per mitigation interval.
The cloud provider is responsible for creating mitigation
domains for customers according to their requirements and
contracts. Different mitigation domains may have different
maximum information leakage rates, performance overheads
and prices, but mitigation parameters are fixed within a miti-
gation domain. When a customer creates a VM instance, she
chooses a mitigation domain suitable for a particular appli-
cation. VM instances in different mitigation domains may be
created interchangeably, and a VM instance can be migrated
from one mitigation domain to another.
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Figure 3: Mitigation domains in Deterland. Each color rep-
resents a different mitigation domain.
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Figure 4: Deterland architecture overview. Orange compo-
nents – including untrusted guest VMs – lie within the mit-
igation boundary, and hence have no direct access to real
time. Blue components connect these orange components
to the outside world, but all interactions between them pass
through the mitigator.
3.2 Architecture Overview
Figure 4 illustrates Deterland’s architecture, which is broadly
similar to conventional hypervisors. However, Deterland en-
forces deterministic execution and predictive mitigation to
control internal and external timing channels.
As shown in Figure 4, each VM instance running on
Deterland has its own mitigation boundary, which delimits
a specific mitigation domain. Code running on a guest VM
within this boundary can observe only artificial time, based
on the number of guest instructions executed since the last
mitigation interval. Thus, the only internal timing source
the VM can access is an artificial time generator (vTimer
in Figure 4). The other components inside the boundary
are also constrained to behave deterministically, so as to
eliminate all internal timing channels.
The only nondeterminism that can affect computations in
a mitigation domain are introduced via explicit I/O crossing
the boundary, through the non-mitigated blue area in Fig-
ure 4. An external observer can measure the times at which
outputs emerge from the cloud computation, yielding exter-
nal timing channels. Deterland uses mitigation to limit the
maximum rate of information leakage across this I/O bound-
ary, however. An internal observer can receive time-stamped
messages from an external clock source, of course, but mit-
igation limits the rate and granularity with which external
time sources are observable by the VM.
Unlike many common hypervisors, Deterland does not
allow its VMs to access hardware directly, but fully virtu-
alizes all essential devices and isolates the VMs from the
physical hardware. This device virtualization is necessary
to prevent untrusted guest VMs from using nondeterminis-
tic device hardware to form high-precision internal timing
sources, which would compromise mitigation security.
Deterland allows a guest VM to communicate with any
remote endpoint, subject to other security policies the cloud
provider might impose, but all external communications are
mitigated – currently including communication between dif-
ferent cloud hosts within the same mitigation domain. An
area for future improvement would be to support determin-
istic intra-cloud communication protocols that need not be
mitigated, but we leave such optimizations to future work.
3.3 Security Assumptions
Deterland’s goal is to protect against both internal and ex-
ternal timing attacks in an environment that can execute ex-
isting, unmodified operating system and application code.
Specifically, Deterland offers timing channel mitigation
against both co-resident and remote adversaries. An adver-
sary is assumed to have full, unrestricted access to his guest
VM’s resources including all guest-accessible hardware and
instructions. The adversary can run arbitrary code that can
flush cache lines, attempt to measure memory access times,
set and receive (virtual) timer interrupts, and send and re-
ceive network packets both inside and outside Deterland.
We impose no special operational limits on the attacker; he
may repeat these activities at will.
We assume an adversary can contrive to co-locate a pro-
cess with a victim, and may allocate multiple virtual ma-
chines on the same machine, although Deterland applies mit-
igation to these VMs as a unit. The underlying hardware pre-
vents direct access to the users’ confidential data via virtu-
alization and access controls. We assume an attacker cannot
escalate privileges and compromise the cloud or a target’s re-
source. An attacker can learn any public information about
a target including virtual machine or process placement and
published or declassified data.
Deterland assumes that clients employ secure communi-
cation primitives, such as HTTPS and TLS. An external at-
tacker may have access to any I/O flows into and out of a
hardware resource executing a target’s process and can com-
pare these accesses against a high-precision clock.
4. Deterland Design
The layout of Deterland components in a single cloud com-
puting node is shown in Figure 5. The hypervisor runs virtual
machines (VMs) inside a mitigation boundary, and isolates
the VMs from real hardware. For implementation simplic-
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Figure 5: Layout of Deterland components
ity the mitigator and backend drivers currently run on sep-
arate CPU cores outside the mitigation boundary, although
this current restriction is not essential to the architecture.
The mitigator communicates with the backend drivers, and
the backend drivers in turn access the underlying hardware.
This section details the design of these three key modules:
hypervisor (§4.1), backend (§4.2) and mitigator (§4.3).
4.1 Hypervisor
The hypervisor consists of four main components: the VM
monitor, the artificial time generator (vTimer), simulated
non-I/O devices, and virtio devices, as shown in Figure 4.
All four parts are in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
because they can access VM state, which must not be visible
to external observers. The hypervisor enforces deterministic
execution and contributes to the mitigation process.
4.1.1 VM Monitor (VMM)
The VM monitor in Deterland has functionality similar to
a conventional VMM. In contrast with conventional VMMs
designed to maximize computing power and minimize over-
head, Deterland’s VMM must enforce strict determinism
within each guest VM despite the performance costs of do-
ing so. This currently means that Deterland’s VMM must
virtualize all privileged instructions, I/O operations and
interrupts, and avoid using hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion features that could compromise determinism. Common
hardware virtualization features could in principle be en-
hanced to enforce deterministic execution, thereby poten-
tially improving Deterland’s performance considerably.
The VMM intercepts instructions that access timers,
statistical counters, and other nondeterministic CPU state.
Timing-related instructions are emulated by the vTimer, and
statistical counters are currently inaccessible to guest VMs
at all. The VMM in this way systematically prevents the
guest from accessing CPU features that could be used as
high-precision timing sources to obtain information about
the execution timings of other guest VMs.
The VMM also tracks the precise number of executed
instructions for the vTimer, and pauses the VM after a de-
terministic instruction count as dictated by the vTimer. Al-
though some historical architectures such as PA-RISC [29]
directly support exact instruction counting, on the x86 ar-
chitecture the VMM must use well-known but more costly
techniques to count instructions precisely in software [19].
Deterland does not support I/O passthrough, as the only
physical hardware inside the deterministic boundary are
CPU and memory, excluding timing-related features. All
devices the VM can access are deterministically simulated.
The VMM intercepts and forwards every I/O instruction to
corresponding virtual device, either a simulated non-I/O de-
vice or a virtio device.
The VMM intercepts and handles all raw hardware inter-
rupts, since hardware interrupts could be utilized as timing
sources. The VMM therefore either disables physical hard-
ware interrupts for the CPU core it runs on, or reroutes them
to the CPU core the mitigators run on. The only interrupts
the VMM injects into guest VMs are virtual interrupts gen-
erated deterministically by simulated devices.
4.1.2 vTimer
The artificial time generator, or vTimer, generates the only
fine-grained notion of time observable to guest VMs, and
schedules mitigated I/O and interrupts. Almost all other
components refer to the vTimer’s artificial notion of time.
The vTimer provides three APIs for other components:
1) get the current artificial time; 2) set an alarm at some fu-
ture artificial time for an event, and 3) get the artificial time
for the nearest event. The first API is used widely in other
components as it is the only timing source they can access.
The second API is used by simulated devices that take pe-
riodic actions. For example, the simulated timer device gen-
erates timer interrupts periodically; the virtio devices com-
municates periodically with the mitigator, at the end of each
computation segment. The vTimer will notify the device at
the artificial time so that it can take the corresponding action
and reset the alarm for the next iteration. The third API is
called by the VMM before each VM entry to pause the VM
after the appropriate number of instructions are executed, or
to manually advance the artificial time in some cases.
The vTimer updates the artificial time after each VM exit.
The VMM notifies the vTimer with the number of instruc-
tions the VM executed since the last VM entries. The VMM
also asks the vTimer to manually increase the artificial time
when it manually advances the program counter in the case
it intercepts an instruction and then “executes” it by hand.
Some virtual devices may ask the vTimer to manually ad-
vance the artificial time in order to simulate I/O operations
that normally take some time to complete. When the VM
enters a halt state, the VMM asks the vTimer to advance the
artificial time to the point for the next vTimer event.
4.1.3 Simulated Devices
The hypervisor simulates essential device hardware for guest
VMs. The simulated devices behave deterministically, do
not access the underlying hardware, and use the vTimer as
their only timing source. Only the most critical devices are
simulated, such as bus controller, interrupt controller and
timer device, and Deterland implements a basic version of
each device to minimize hypervisor complexity.
4.1.4 virtio Devices
All external-world I/O in Deterland uses the virtio inter-
face [41]. Virtio is the widely-adopted, de facto standard for
I/O virtualization in current hypervisors. Its request-based
ring structure has a simple design, and its asynchronous na-
ture enables I/O buffering and operation bundling across De-
terland’s mitigation boundary.
When a guest VM needs to perform I/O, it first creates
descriptors and data buffers in guest memory, then notifies
the virtio device. Conventional hypervisors extract requests
from guest memory and process them right away. Deterland
instead extracts the requests immediately but then buffers
them in a mitigation queue. At the end of the current mitiga-
tion interval, the vTimer notifies the virtio device to send all
the queued requests to the mitigator as a bundle, and receives
a response bundle from the mitigator. After receiving this re-
sponse bundle, the virtio device unpacks virtio responses and
copies them into guest memory. When the virtio device fin-
ishes processing I/O responses, it sets a new alarm for the
next mitigation interval.
The data transferred between the virtio devices and the
mitigator are not the scattered, raw data buffers as in the
virtio specification. For output requests, the virtio device
allocates a shared data buffer in hypervisor memory, copies
data from guest memory to the buffer, and sets up the request
with the address of the buffer. This data buffer is shared
between the hypervisor, the mitigator and the backend driver,
but is inaccessible to the guest VM. For input requests, the
virtio device simply sets up the request without an attached
buffer. The data buffer is then allocated and attached to
the corresponding response by the backend driver. For both
types of requests, data buffers are attached to the responses
so that the virtio device can safely deallocate the buffers after
copying data into guest memory.
4.2 Backend
The backend performs actual I/O operations. After receiving
an I/O bundle from the mitigator, the backend driver unpacks
the bundle and performs the I/O requests it contains. Once an
output request finishes, or an input arrives, the driver sets up
the response and sends it back to the mitigator.
The backend driver does not bundle responses, because
it does not know when a mitigation interval starts and ends.
Instead the backend sends the mitigator individual responses
and leaves the task of buffering and bundling responses to
the mitigator.
4.3 Mitigator
The mitigator implements the core of the mitigation process,
which adapts previously-proposed mitigation techniques to
the hypervisor environment.
mitigation
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4
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Figure 6: Mitigations for outputs: requests are bundled at the
end of each artificial-time period, and become available for
the device at the beginning of the next real-time period.
Deterland supports different mitigation intervals for dif-
ferent I/O queues of virtio devices for the same VM instance.
In practice, however, we expect cloud providers to use the
same mitigation interval for all virtio devices to rate-limit in-
formation leakage consistently within a mitigation domain.
When a VM instance is created, the hypervisor synchronizes
all mitigator instances for the virtio devices.
The control loop of a virtio device’s mitigator is straight-
forward: 1) receive a request bundle from the virtio device;
2) collect all pending responses until the next time slot;
3) forward the request bundle to the backend driver, and
4) bundle all responses and send the bundle to the virtio de-
vice. The communication primitive the mitigator uses be-
tween the virtio device and itself is a synchronous exchange
operation, while the primitive it uses between the backend
driver and itself is an asynchronous send and receive.
As discussed in §4.1.4, the actual data buffer is shared
among the mitigator, the virtio device and the local backend
driver. Therefore the actual objects being mitigated are the
I/O metadata, i.e., virtio request bundles and response bun-
dles and permissions for accessing the actual data buffer. For
some hardware, the mitigator can be embedded in the local
backend driver to further reduce communication overhead.
In this case, the backend driver becomes a part of TCB.
4.3.1 Mitigation in Deterland
Deterland does not limit the number of I/O operations in a
real-time period or an artificial-time period, unlike earlier
mitigation designs [5]. By enforcing deterministic execution,
the content and ordering of I/O operations in an artificial-
time period become pure deterministic functions of the VM
state and the contents of response bundles virtio devices
receive at the beginning of the artificial-time period. We can
therefore use the request bundle in place of a single request
as the atomic unit of output mitigation, as shown in Figure 6.
Deterland mitigates both input and output. The mitiga-
tion for input is symmetric with that of output, and uses a
response bundle as the unit of mitigation. Figure 7 shows the
data flow of request and response bundles as well as infor-
mation leakage. External observers can obtain at most one
bit of leaked timing information in each mitigation interval.
The VM may gain several bits of information in an artificial-
time period, but no more than what external observers could
have learned already. For example, in Figure 7, an external
R0 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
, , , / , ,
, , , , /
Figure 7: Information leakage: when no request bundle is
available at the beginning of a real-time period, external ob-
servers gain one bit of information; when responses bundle
contains responses from multiple real-time periods, the VM
gains the same information. Red frownies represent potential
one-bit information leakage events.
observer may learn one bit of information from the fact that
“there is no output in R5 because A3 missed the deadline.”
Correspondingly, the VM learns that “the input at the be-
ginning of A5 comes from R4 and R5.” These two “leaks”
reveal exactly the same information, however, as they both
reflect the same root cause – A3 missed the deadline.
In practice, mitigation introduces 2–3 mitigation intervals
of latency to I/O operations – the most important perfor-
mance cost of mitigation. For example, in Figure 7, if the
VM issues a disk I/O operation in A1, the operation will be
bundled at the end of A1 and actually performed in R3. The
result of the operation will then be bundled at the end of
R3 and become available to the guest VM in A4. The VM
thus sees a 2–3 mitigation interval latency. If the VM misses
deadlines during this roundtrip, the latency may be higher.
Symmetrically, if an external request arrives in R1, it can be
processed as early as in A2 and the corresponding response
will be published as early as in R4.
Multiple I/O devices for the same VM instance could
leak more than one bit information per mitigation interval if
incorrectly configured. This leakage is avoided if the cloud
provider sets one mitigation interval for all VM instances
in the same mitigation domain, and Deterland applies the
value to all I/O queues for each VM instance. Deterland
also keeps the real-time periods across I/O queues for the
same VM instance synchronized. The artificial-time periods
are naturally synchronized as they use the same notion of
artificial time.
4.3.2 Mitigation Configuration
The maximum information leakage rate is directly related to
the mitigation interval. However, the upper bound is likely
to be hard to reach, especially when the computing node
has low utilization. Actual information leakage is heavily
impacted by the virtual CPU speed and other factors.
Figure 8 illustrates information leakage for different uti-
lizations under different vCPU speed settings. In Figure 8a,
the vCPU speed is significantly lower than the host CPU
speed, which means that each segment runs only a small
number of instructions and the host CPU can always com-
plete them in a single real-time slot. Provided the VM always
finishes the segment within one time slot, it effectively be-
haves like a hard real-time system and leaks no timing infor-
(a) Slow vCPU, low utilization,
no information leakage
/ /
(b) Fast vCPU, high utilization,
two bits are leaked
Figure 8: Information leakage and utilization
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Figure 9: Time synchronization using piggybacked value
from the mitigator
mation at all, at a likely cost of substantially under-utilizing
the CPU. In contrast, the vCPU speed in Figure 8a is close to
or higher than the host CPU speed. In this case the VM may
leak one bit of information per time slot – namely whether
the segment completed execution in this time slot or in some
later slot – but utilizes the CPU more efficiently.
Calculating the actual amount of information an execu-
tion trace leaks using Shannon entropy [43] is possible in
principle but difficult. However, we know that an under-
utilized computing node is unlikely to miss deadlines and
hence leak information. An over-utilized computing node,
on which the VM has 50% chance of finishing a segment
in time and 50% chance of missing the deadline, might be
expected to leak information at the maximum rate.
4.3.3 Time Synchronization
If one segment takes longer than expected, the artificial time
the VM perceives will permanently become one mitigation
interval behind real time, as A5 and R6 in Figure 9. Deter-
land automatically adjusts the guest VM’s perception of time
so that artificial and real time remain roughly synchronized,
provided all I/O queues have the same mitigation interval.
This requirement is normally satisfied as long as the cloud
provider applies the same mitigation interval to all devices.
This time synchronization leaks no additional information.
Just before exchanging buffers, the mitigator calculates
the number of elapsed real-time periods since the last ex-
change, and piggybacks this number in the response bundle,
as shown in Figure 9. The virtio devices are expected to re-
ceive the same number at the same time since the mitigators
are synchronized, and the mitigation intervals for all devices
are the same. After receiving this number, the virtio device
notifies the vTimer to update the speed ratio accordingly.
The speed ratio controls how fast the vTimer advances
artificial time. If the speed ratio of the vTimer is set to n, it
advances the artificial time n times faster than normal, which
is equivalent to temporarily reducing the virtual CPU speed
to 1/n-th of its normal value. The number of instructions in
a segment remains unchanged, however. Therefore the virtio
devices need to set up the alarm n times as far ahead as they
normally would. This speed ratio compensates the missed
real-time periods and quickly recovers artificial time to keep
it synchronized with real time.
The only information crossing the mitigation boundary is
the number of elapsed real-time slots, and this information
is already known to the external observer and the VM, so
the piggybacked value does not leak additional information.
The maximum leakage rate remains constant since the actual
length of segments and time slots remains unchanged.
4.4 Limitations
Deterland currently supports only a single virtual CPU
per guest VM, though it can run many single-core guests
on a multicore machine. Enforcing deterministic execu-
tion on multiprocessor guests is possible but complex and
costly [20]. More efficient user-space libraries for deter-
ministic parallelism [16] still introduce overhead and can-
not prevent malicious guests from violating determinism to
gain access to high-precision time sources. Determinator’s
microkernel-enforced deterministic parallel model [7] would
satisfy Deterland’s security requirements but is not compat-
ible with existing applications or guest operating systems.
This limitation may not be a serious problem for many
“scale-out” cloud applications, however, which are typically
designed to divide work just as readily across processes or
whole VMs as among shared-memory threads. Especially in
large-scale parallel processing paradigms such as MapRe-
duce, there may not be much fundamental efficiency differ-
ence between running a workload on N M -core (virtual)
machines versus running the same workload on N × M
single-core (virtual) machines. Deterland can run these N ×
M single-core VMs organized as M guests on each of N
physical M -core machines.
Another limitation of Deterland is that it mitigates all
inter-VM communication, even among cloud hosts within
the same mitigation domain, which is in principle unnec-
essary to ensure security. This limitation might be solvable
through deterministic intra-cloud communication primitives
or efficient deterministic-time synchronization techniques,
but we leave such improvements to future work.
Deterland currently provides only coarse-grained tim-
ing information control, across entire guest VMs. An IFC-
based timing information control [45] might in principle of-
fer finer-granularity control and reduce mitigation overhead.
Finally, Deterland does not support direct hardware ac-
cess from the VM even if the hardware itself supports virtu-
alization features, such as Intel SR-IOV. Future hypervisor
optimizations and hardware improvements could eventually
enable Deterland to make use of hardware virtualization and
reduce its performance costs.
5. Implementation
Deterland builds upon CertiKOS [24], a certified hypervi-
sor. Deterland adds mitigation, an artificial timer, timing-
related virtual devices such as vPIT and vRTC, and virtio
devices. Deterland also virtualizes the network device via
a network driver running in the hypervisor. CertiKOS gives
guests direct access to network devices via IOMMU, but De-
terland cannot do this without compromising determinism.
Deterland also optimizes IPC performance for communica-
tion patterns resulting from I/O mitigation. Deterland’s code
additions to CertiKOS are not yet certified.
Deterland inherits several drawbacks from CertiKOS.
CertiKOS currently only supports a single VM instance per
CPU core. Also the CertiKOS disk driver utilizes a relatively
slow AHCI mode.
Deterland uses Intel VT-x instructions for virtualization,
but does not make use of Intel VT-d for direct I/O in order to
isolate the VM from physical device hardware.
5.1 Precise Versus Coarse Execution
For experimentation purposes, the Deterland hypervisor can
be configured to enforce either precise or coarse determinis-
tic execution. The coarse mode reflects the currently-untrue
assumption that the hardware is capable of interrupting exe-
cution after a precise number of instructions. Current x86
hardware unfortunately does not have this capability, but
other architectures (notably PA-RISC) have offered it [29],
and it could in principle be added to x86 processors. Coarse
mode experiments may thus offer some insight into Deter-
land’s potential performance on enhanced hardware.
In the precise execution mode, the Deterland hypervisor
uses well-known but costly techniques to emulate exact in-
struction counting in software [19]. Deterland uses Intel’s
architectural performance monitoring counters to count the
executed instructions in guest mode, and to pause the VM af-
ter a certain number of executed instructions. In practice the
counter will nondeterministically overshoot, since the Intel
CPU uses the local APIC to generate performance counter
overflow interrupts instead of generating precise exceptions
internally. The propagation latency is around 80 instructions
in average, and the maximum latency we observed is around
250. Deterland therefore pauses the VM 250 instructions
early, then uses Monitor TF to single-step the VM to the
target instruction count.
Since the performance counters are highly nondetermin-
istic, Deterland hides them from guest VMs by counterfeit-
ing CPUID results and intercepting MSR accesses.
5.2 Artificial Time
The vTimer does not directly calculate artificial time, but
only calculates instruction counts. The “time” the VM per-
ceives is generated by the vRTC and vPIT, which use the vir-
tual CPU frequency to calculate the number of instructions
to execute between guest VM interrupts.
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Figure 10: Interrupt routing
Deterland intercepts the rdtsc instruction and accesses
to the MSR alias of the TSC. The vTimer then uses the
number of executed instructions as the value of TSC and
simulates a vCPU that executes exactly one instruction per
cycle, to support OS and application code that relies on the
TSC without compromising determinism.
5.3 Interrupts
Deterland disables the LAPIC timer, enables performance
counter overflow interrupts on the CPU cores the VM runs
on, and configures the IOAPIC to reroute all external inter-
rupts to the core the mitigator runs on. The complete inter-
rupt routing scheme is shown in Figure 10. Guest VMs are
thus preempted by performance counter overflows, instead
of by the true timer. Deterland uses IPIs for IPC since each
guest VM runs under the control of a CertiKOS process.
Virtual interrupts are queued to the vPIC first, then in-
jected into the VM as soon as IF in the guest’s eflags is
set. Virtualization of MSI is not yet implemented, and the
interrupt numbers for devices are currently hardcoded.
5.4 I/O Virtualization
For simplicity, Deterland currently uses port I/O instead of
memory-mapped I/O. MMIO and port I/O each cost one VM
exit because Deterland intercepts all I/O operations. MMIO
requires the VMM to decipher the guest page tables and
instructions to get the actual I/O operation. Port I/O is much
simpler, however, and the port address space is sufficient for
all simulated and virtio devices.
6. Evaluation
This section evaluates the practicality of VM-wide timing
mitigation, focusing on measuring the performance over-
head of Deterland across different configurations. Experi-
ments are run on a commodity PC system consisting of a 4-
core Intel Core i5-4705S CPU running at 3.2GHz with 16GB
of 1600MHz DDR3 RAM, a 128GB SSD and a gigabit Eth-
ernet card (Realtek 8111G). This system design corresponds
roughly to a low-cost cloud hardware configuration.
We compare execution on Deterland against QEMU/KVM
2.1.0 [31] running on Ubuntu 14.10. For a fair comparison,
we enable VT-x and disable VT-d in the BIOS, so that KVM
uses the same CPU features for virtualization. The guest OS
is Ubuntu 14.04.2 LTS server version.
As Deterland, by design, does not expose real time to the
VM, we measure performance overhead using vmcalls that
report hypervisor statistical data to the VM via x86 registers.
These calls are included strictly for experimentation and are
not part of the production hypervisor interface.
We report performance overhead versus KVM along with
an upper-bound estimate of information leakage rate. This
estimated leakage is a loose bound reflecting total possi-
ble information flow across the mitigation boundary, includ-
ing noise and known public information. It seems unlikely
that practical data-exfiltration attacks could come anywhere
close to this maximum leakage rate, except perhaps with the
deliberate help of conspiring “trojan” code in the victim it-
self.
6.1 Cloud Configurations
Deterland depends on three main tunable parameters: miti-
gation interval, vCPU speed and precise/coarse mode. The
vCPU speed may heavily impact the performance of CPU-
bounded applications, as it limits the number of instructions
executed in a time slot. The mitigation interval will likely
impact the performance of I/O-bounded applications, as it
adds delays for mitigation purposes. Precise mode intro-
duces more overhead than coarse mode due to the need to
perform precise instruction-counting in software.
We examine different settings and report both perfor-
mance overhead and maximum information leakage. Infor-
mation leakage rate does not strictly reflect Shannon entropy,
but is approximated by the number of missed deadlines, as-
suming the VM normally finishes every segment in time.
VM entry and exit overhead is categorized as VMX, and is
measured by the number of VM exits. The time for of one
VM exits is measured by single-stepping a piece of code. We
use 1.0445 microsecond per VM exit for all the benchmarks.
6.2 Micro-Benchmarks
The micro-benchmarks focus on three major computing re-
sources a cloud provides: CPU (§6.2.1), network I/O (§6.2.2)
and disk I/O (§6.2.3).
6.2.1 CPU
The CPU benchmark uses the built-in CPU test in sys-
bench [33] to check 20000 primes. We tested different set-
tings of vCPU speed and mitigation intervals. This experi-
ment aims to reveal Deterland’s overhead over KVM.
Figure 11a and Figure 12a shows performance results and
maximum leakage. Figure 13a breaks down execution time.
Performance slowdown is almost linear in vCPU frequency.
Performance saturates near 6.4GHz because the CPU is ca-
pable of executing two simple instructions in one cycle, or
6.4 billion instructions per second.
Clearly the precise mode introduces extra overhead due
to single-stepping. The overhead for single-stepping alone
is 30% for 1ms mitigation interval, including the time spent
in the hypervisor and during VM entries and VM exits. The
same overhead is 5% in total for 100ms interval.
Almost all remaining overhead comes from mitigation,
because the CPU-bounded application mostly executes in-
structions that do not cause VM exits. A cloud provider
might in practice schedule another VM instance during the
mitigation period of this VM. Thus the actual overhead to the
cloud provider is small in coarse mode, or in precise mode
with a long mitigation interval.
The higher red line in Figure 12a is the theoretical upper
bound of information leakage rate for 1ms mitigation inter-
val, while the lower red line is for 100ms mitigation interval.
The estimated information leakage rate is significantly lower
than the theoretical upper bound, and much of this estimated
leakage is in turn likely to be noise.
6.2.2 Network I/O
Network overheads for TCP and UDP were obtained via
iperf [46], with default window sizes (47.3K for TCP and
160K for UDP). All tests run on a 3.2GHz vCPU.
Figure 11b and Figure 12b shows performance and max-
imum leakage. Figure 13b breaks down execution time. As
an I/O bounded application, iperf does not execute the max-
imum number of instructions per time slot as in the CPU
benchmark, because the kernel executes hlt when all pro-
cesses are blocked by I/O.
The VM is under-utilized in most settings, but may still
leak information. This leakage is caused by the hypervisor,
as the hypervisor still needs to move data between guest
memory and the shared data buffer. The mitigator may not
receive bundled requests in time because the hypervisor is
busy copying data. The estimated information leakage rate
is much less than the theoretical maximum for TCP because
traffic is low, while the leakage rate for UDP is higher due
to higher-volume traffic. However, this estimated leakage
mostly reflects public information about traffic volume, and
is unlikely to contain much truly sensitive information.
UDP bandwidth changes over mitigation intervals as ex-
pected. When the mitigation interval is too short, the hyper-
visor spends significant time on VM entries and exits, in-
stead of sending packets. In contrast, when the mitigation
interval is too long, the VM may not have enough virtio de-
scriptors to send packets, as most of them are buffered in the
hypervisor or the mitigator.
TCP bandwidth exhibits more erratic behavior, because
the guest’s congestion control algorithms are severely im-
pacted by the effects of mitigation. The reported result is
measured with CUBIC; other algorithms aside from BIC are
basically unusable. These results are understandable since
congestion control is highly timing-sensitive. A future op-
timization might therefore be to move the TCP stack from
the guest VM into the hypervisor and give the guest a more
latency-tolerant socket-proxy interface.
6.2.3 Disk I/O
Raw disk The disk benchmark uses fio [8] for both syn-
chronous disk I/O and Linux’s native asynchronous disk I/O
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Figure 11: Performance overhead for micro benchmarks
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Figure 12: Estimated information leakage rate for micro benchmarks
(libaio). Synchronous disk I/O operations are expected to ex-
hibit latencies up to three times as long as the mitigation in-
terval, as discussed in §4.3.1. The total data size is 16GB for
the libaio test, and 1GB for the synchronous test.
Figure 11c and Figure 12c shows performance results and
maximum leakage. Figure 13c breaks down execution time.
The estimated leakage rate is a order of magnitude lower
than the theoretical upper bound. As with the network
benchmark, the estimated leakage rate is largely caused by
data copying in the hypervisor, and is unlikely to contain
much truly sensitive information.
The asynchronous disk I/O basically keeps the maximum
rate for all mitigation intervals, except in the 100ms interval
case due to a lack of virtio descriptors. Deterland is 50%
slower than KVM because the underlying AHCI driver is not
well-optimized. The throughput is still more than a spinning
magnetic disk offers, however.
Synchronous disk I/O, on the other hand, shows a recip-
rocal rate as expected. With a 1ms mitigation interval, the
throughput is 10 times slower than that of KVM, and the VM
nearly stalls when the mitigation interval is more than 10ms.
Fortunately, many disk I/O bounded applications, such as
databases, use asynchronous I/O and data buffer pools to tol-
erate disk latency. Modern filesystems also have features like
buffering and read-ahead to improve performance.
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Figure 13: Execution time breakdowns, the whole execution time is 100%
Filesystem The filesystem benchmark also uses fio for
three popular filesystems: btrfs, ext4 and ext2. We turn on
LZO compression for btrfs, and journaling for both ext4
and btrfs. We simulates a common filesystem access pat-
tern by performing random reads and writes on files. The
file size ranges from 1KB to 1MB, and each I/O operation
reads or writes between 4KB and 32KB of data. We use the
O_DIRECT flag to skip the kernel data buffer, so as to reveal
the impact of filesystems themselves.
Figure 11d and Figure 12d shows performance results and
maximum leakage. Figure 13d breaks down execution time.
The ext filesystems show a pattern similar to the syn-
chronous disk I/O benchmark, since most filesystem oper-
ations are synchronous. The journaling feature does not pro-
vide a performance benefit in this case.
The btrfs filesystem performs much better when the mit-
igation interval is long, Btrfs reads and writes the same
amount of data with many fewer disk I/O operations, be-
cause of its compression feature and a better buffering mech-
anism. However, when the mitigation interval is short, its
compression operations produce more overhead.
6.3 Macro Benchmarks
We use several benchmark suites to explore realistic cloud
workloads. The PARSEC [11] benchmark represents sci-
entific computation workloads. OLTP-Bench [17] repre-
sents typical relational database workloads. The YCSB [15]
benchmark represents key-value storage workloads.
PARSEC Complementing the CPU micro-benchmark, PAR-
SEC measures performance overhead for more complex
compute-intensive applications. Instead of simple instruc-
tions, PARSEC applications exercise more CPU features
such as FPU and cache. We compare Deterland’s PARSEC
performance against KVM with 3.2GHz real CPU speed.
The results are shown in Figure 14. The slowdown ratio
is near 1 for all applications when vCPU speed is 6.4GHz.
Most benchmarks show sub-linear slowdown ratios, as
the actual functioning units are saturated, like FPU for
blackscholes and streamcluster. The only appli-
cation showing nearly linear slowdown is fluidanimate,
which performs frequent lock operations; lock operations on
a single-core vCPU degenerate to normal instructions. Per-
formance is fairly competitive when the vCPU frequency is
3.2GHz, regardless of mitigation interval.
Storage We test the MySQL server with the TPC-C work-
load from OLTP-Bench, with local clients and remote clients.
We also test the Cassandra server with three different work-
loads from YCSB, with local clients and remote clients. The
backend filesystems for both MySQL and Cassandra are
ext4 and btrfs, with the same configuration as in the filesys-
tem micro benchmark. The remote clients run on a Linux
machine outside the mitigation boundary.
Figure 15a shows performance overhead, and Figure 15b
shows latency overhead. Overall performance is acceptable
with a 1ms mitigation interval. Cassandra shows a better
slowdown ratio than MySQL, as it has less chance of holding
locks during mitigation. Cassandra is also more tolerant of
mitigation level for local clients, as it has simpler buffering
requirements than those of MySQL. Cassandra maintains the
same slowdown ratio when the mitigation interval becomes
10ms, whereas MySQL becomes unusable.
The remote benchmark, however, reveals the impact of
network latency. Both Cassandra and MySQL suffer signif-
icant performance drop when the mitigation level increases
to 10ms. The average latency remains nearly the same for all
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Figure 14: Performance overhead for scientific computation benchmarks
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Figure 15: Performance overhead for storage benchmarks
local benchmarks, while the remote latency is higher due to
extra network mitigation in addition to disk mitigation.
6.4 Deployment Considerations
As the benchmarks indicate, we find the best mitigation in-
terval for legacy applications to be around 1ms. Estimated
information leakage is around 100bps for all benchmarks,
and theoretically bounded at 1Kbps. Of course, much of
this estimated leakage is unlikely to be sensitive information
useful to an attacker. If the VM sends network packets at
high rate constantly, the current Deterland prototype spends
more than 1ms to handle all the VM exits and data buffering,
and exhibits a relatively fixed pattern of missed deadlines.
This fixed pattern, if predictable, does not actually leak sen-
sitive information. CPU-bounded applications exhibit little
overhead. Network-bounded applications have no more than
50% throughput loss for both UDP and TCP, compared to
KVM. Cloud providers such as Rackspace are known to
limit network bandwidth for VM instances anyway, which
may hide this throughput impact. While filesystem perfor-
mance suffers, well-designed applications like databases
handle this reasonably well and incur no more than 60%
throughput loss in exchange for mitigation.
The ideal vCPU speed depends on the characteristics of
the underlying physical CPU. However, most VM instances
in the cloud do not execute a full allocation of instructions in
a given segment. As a result, even if the vCPU speed is set
high, the VM will likely be under-utilized.
In summary, applications that are CPU bounded may not
notice any appreciable difference when running in Deter-
land. Applications using asynchronous I/O exhibit moderate
overhead, less than 30%, with a 1ms mitigation interval. Ap-
plications that heavily depend on synchronous I/O may not
be suitable for Deterland.
Deterland represents only one of many possible design
points for systematic timing-channel mitigation in the cloud,
of course, in many cases emphasizing generality and imple-
mentation simplicity over other considerations. It is likely
that many further optimizations, possible hardware features,
and specialization to particular application or security mod-
els of interest could further substantially improve Deter-
land’s performance and practicality.
7. Related Work
Timing channel control has been well-studied in commercial
security systems for decades [10, 12, 21, 28, 32, 39]. We now
discuss related work grouped into three categories: control-
ling internal timing channels, controlling external channels,
and detecting timing channels.
7.1 Controlling Internal Timing Channels
Controlling cache-based timing channels Wang et al.
propose an effort that refines the processor architecture to
minimize information leakage through cache-based timing
channels [49]. Oswald et al. present a method to disable
cache sharing, avoiding cache-based timing attack [37].
these approaches are difficult to use in the cloud model,
because either they require specific infrastructure architec-
ture, or undermine the cloud’s economic model of over-
subscribing and statistically multiplexing resources among
customers [6].
System-enforced Determinism Aviram et al. propose to
eliminate internal timing channels by forcing virtual ma-
chine execution to be deterministic [6]. The proposed ap-
proach does not address external timing channels, how-
ever. In addition, the effort achieves deterministic execution
through Determinator, an OS that imposes new parallel pro-
gramming constraints and limits compatibility with existing
applications and OS kernels.
StopWatch [34] replicates each VM across three physical
machines and uses the median of certain I/O events’ tim-
ing from the three replicated VMs to determine the timings
observed by other VMs co-resident on the same physical
machines. However, StopWatch cannot fundamentally elim-
inate or bound internal timing channels, since attackers still
can learn information by probing multiple victim VMs.
Language-based timing channel control Many language-
based efforts address internal timing channels [27, 52] and
mitigate external timing channels [42, 44, 47]. Zhang et al.
propose a language-level timing mitigation approach, which
can reason about the secrecy of computation time more ac-
curately [54]. In this effort, well-typed programs provably
leak a bounded amount of information over time via exter-
nal timing channels. Through predictive mitigation, this ef-
fort also offers an expressive programming model, where ap-
plications are expressible only if timing leakage is provably
bounded by a desired amount. Unfortunately these language-
based approaches require programs to be rewritten in new
and unfamiliar languages.
7.2 Controlling External Timing Channels
Additive noise To resist external timing channels, sev-
eral proposals inject additive noise [23, 25, 26]. These ap-
proaches control timing channels only in specific workloads,
however. In addition, stealthy timing channels robust to ad-
ditive noise have been constructed [35].
Predictive mitigation Predictive timing mitigation is a
general scheme for provably limiting leakage through exter-
nal channels [5, 53]. In general, predictive mitigation works
by predicting future timing from past non-sensitive infor-
mation, and enforcing these predictions. When a timing-
sensitive event arrives before the predicted time point, the
event is delayed to output according to the prediction; if a
prediction fails, a new epoch with a longer prediction begins
and information is leaked. This approach not only tracks the
amount of information leaked at each epoch transition, but
also offers a provable guarantee on total leakage. However,
predictive mitigation does not directly address internal tim-
ing channels, a practical virtual machine’s workload is hard
to predict, and predictive mitigation cannot identify timing
variations that may leak sensitive information, unnecessarily
hurting performance when most timing variation is benign.
7.3 Detecting Timing Channels
Instead of controlling timing channels, some proposals aim
to detect potential timing channels in programs or systems.
Most existing approaches [13, 22, 38] detect timing channels
either by inspecting some high-level statistic (e.g., entropy)
of network traffic, or by looking for specific patterns. A pow-
erful adversary might be able to circumvent these defenses
by varying timing in a slightly different way, however.
Chen et al. propose to use time-deterministic reply (TDR)
to discover timing channels [14]. A TDR system not only
offers deterministic replay, but also reproduces events that
have non-deterministic timing, thus detecting potential tim-
ing channels. While both of these efforts make use of de-
terminism, Deterland aims to control timing channels proac-
tively rather than detecting timing channels retroactively.
8. Conclusion
This paper has presented Deterland, a hypervisor that runs
unmodified OS kernels and applications while controlling
both internal and external channels. While only a first step,
our proof-of-concept prototype and experiments suggest that
systematic timing channel mitigation may be practical and
realistic for security-critical cloud applications, depending
on configuration parameters and application workload.
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